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This study empirically analyses on the basis of a panel of grant requests to the Swiss National 
Science Foundation (SNSF. From the results it can be concluded, that the different scientific 
disciplines react in very different ways to the institutional and financial framework conditions 
set by the funding agency. Regarding the expansion of the tertiary educational system it can 
concluded that it has an impact on research funding in the form of two contrary influences. 
These two effects offset each other to the extent that they do not suffice to explain the rising 
trend in terms of the number of requests observable as from the year 2000. 
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 1.  Introduction – Current Situation  
 
Research at universities is increasingly being financed through research funding agencies and, 
in  a  parallel  development,  increasingly  less  through  the  general  funds  appropriated  to 
universities  and,  by  extension,  to  professorial  chairs.  The  financing  of  research  through 
external agencies is said to contribute to an improvement in the quality of research output by 
virtue of the competitive components involved in the research grant process. Irrespective of 
the shifting significance of these two funding channels, research funding agencies in many 
countries are generally being showered with a practically exponentially growing number of 
research funding applications. The present study investigates, based on an analysis of the 
Swiss  National  Science  Foundation  (SNSF),  to  what  extent  the  growth  of  the  tertiary 
education system has contributed to the rapid rise in applications for research grants during 
the past several years and whether the given structures of research funding agencies and the 
funding  possibilities  they  offer  might  also  be  a  factor  for  the  strong  increase  in  grant 
applications.
1  
This investigation is in many ways explorative in nature because no similar studies, neither 
theoretical nor empirical, have - to our knowledge - been conducted in the past. The initial 
results of this investigation do reveal, however, that the differing behaviour and the differing 
response patterns of researchers in different scientific disciplines should, whenever the issue 
of  demand  for  research  project  grants  is  under  discussion,  be  an  object  of  scientific 
investigation. Such investigation is likely to generate also new insights into the production of 
knowledge in the individual scientific disciplines. 
 
 
2.  Research questions and hypotheses  
In  this  study  two  groups  of  hypotheses  that  are  of  relevance  in  a  theoretical  sense  were 
investigated  even  though  there  actually  is  no  real  theory  on  the  factors  determining  the 
number of research grant applications at national research funding agencies. These two groups 
of hypotheses differ in that the first group covers “push” factors, i.e., those factors that are 
defined by the environment in which the grant applicants work and conduct their research. 
These  are  factors  that  directly  influence  the  likelihood  that  researchers  will  submit  an 
application for a research grant. The second group, the “pull” factors, comprises those factors 
that  are  determined  by  the  research  funding  agencies  themselves,  in  this  case  the  Swiss 
National  Science  Foundation,  due  to  the  various  ways  in  which  they  are  organized  and 
operate; they have a direct and indirect influence on researcher demand for grants. 
 
                                            
1 This report is based on a study conducted by the Centre for Research in Economics of Education at  the 
University of Berne at the request of the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF). The responsibility for the 
contents of this essay resides solely with the authors and any views and opinions expressed herein may not 
necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the Swiss National Science Foundation or the institutions represented 
by the authors. The authors thank Hans Peter Hertig and Véronique Jost for this research assignment and their 
confidence  and  they  are  also  grateful  to  numerous  employees  at  the  SNSF  for  their  valuable  assistance  in 
obtaining information. Thanks also go to Petra Koller, Philipp Dubach and Philippe Jacobi at the Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office for their assistance in obtaining valuable data material and other additional information. The 
usual disclaimer holds.   1 
 
2.1   Push factors 
In this group, primary attention is focused on the employment relationship of the researchers 
and the influence this exerts on the number of research grant applications submitted. Within 
this group, a distinction can also be made between push factors that influence the number of 
funding applications submitted per researcher within a given research community and push 
factors  that  have  an  effect  on  the  overall  number  of  researchers  who  might  submit  an 
application for a research grant. The latter sub-group will alter the total number of applications 
submitted even if the number of applications submitted per researcher stays the same.  
 
a)  Expansion of the tertiary system 
The increase in the number of people who can or, in fact, should submit grant applications is 
primarily dependent on the quantitative development of the university system because it is 
from this system where most of the applicants originate. Therefore, the number of people who 
conduct research in the university system is, ultimately, also influenced by the size of the 
student population at universities because one can assume that the number of non-professorial 
and professorial teaching staff will eventually be adjusted to the number of students attending 
universities (albeit after a certain delay and to a proportionally lesser extent). Since both parts 
of  the  system,  i.e.,  the  non-professorial  and  professorial  faculty,  are  expected  to  conduct 
research  in  addition  to  their  teaching  responsibilities,  the  number  of  persons  who  could 
potentially submit applications for research grants from the SNSF should grow in tandem with 
the expansion of the tertiary system. Such a straightforward connection between the size of 
the  student  population  and  the  number  of  researchers  at  universities  cannot,  however,  be 
generalized nor can it be assumed that it is a constant. There are two main reasons for this. 
One is that research activities in certain disciplines may simply be increased due to a need for 
research  knowledge,  without  being  initially  triggered  by  a  change  in  student  enrolment 
numbers.
2  In such cases the number of students enrolled may even display a delayed response 
to an increase in research activity. The other reason is that – as mentioned above – an increase 
in student enrolment can initially have an adverse effect on the ratio of students to teaching 
staff until, at a much later point in time, more university faculty staff are hired. If the number 
of  faculty  staff  increases  at  a  proportionally  slower  rate,  it  can  be  assumed  that  the 
professorial and non-professorial faculty will have to meet much greater teaching obligations 
and, as a result, the number of research grant applications per researcher is likely to decline. 
In this case an expansion of the tertiary system could even have a neutral, or indeed negative, 
impact.  A  decisive  factor  here  is  certainly  the  given  situation  in  which  the  discipline  or 
university finds itself.  
 
b)  Changes in the general conditions for research activities  
It can also be presumed that there are factors within the university system that affect both the 
probability  that  researchers  will  submit  grant  applications  and  the  frequency  of  such 
submissions. There are two main channels that qualify as possible influencing factors. It is 
quasi-inherent in the system that research activity has a positive impact on the market value of 
researchers.  Therefore,  every  researcher  has  a  fundamental  interest  in  maintaining  a  high 
output of high-quality research. In this regard, funding possibilities via third-party agencies or 
                                            
2 For example in the field of environmental sciences at the ETH in the wake of the debate on dying forests.   2 
offices, the SNSF, for example, are an opportunity for researchers to achieve these goals more 
quickly by obtaining more financial resources, to say nothing of the positive reputation value 
that is created whenever an application for research funding is accepted. In order for such a 
situation  to  actually  increase  the  number  of  applications  submitted  per  researcher, 
modifications  to  incentive  systems  making  it  more  rewarding  and  more  imperative  for 
researchers to seek and obtain research funding at the universities (or in specific disciplines) 
would have to be observable. Looking at British and American universities as an example, it 
can  be  said  that  such  incentive  systems  have  certainly  become  more  common  and  more 
effective at the international research level over the past several years.  
Apart from the changes concerning the incentive structure of university research operations 
(as  well  as  in  non-university  settings),  there  has  been  another  development  that  actually 
should have a positive impact on the number of grant applications submitted. The overall 
funds  available  at  most  universities  (ex  third-party  funding)  have  stagnated  in  inflation-
adjusted terms during the past few years. Considering that the growing student population has 
indeed resulted in an increase in the overall number of staff at universities, this means that the 
amount of funding per professorship has declined. Therefore, since increasingly fewer funds 
are available per professorial chair, every professor should feel compelled to compensate for 
the decrease in funding by turning to third-party funding sources in order to maintain the same 
level of research output (not to mention the possible efficiency gains, which are probably 
more easily achieved when teaching than researching). Nevertheless, while one can certainly 
grasp that a reduction in funding per professorship would basically have a positive impact on 
the  number  of  grant  applications  submitted,  here,  again,  differing  effects  are  conceivable 
depending  on  the  actual  circumstances  at  each  university.  For  instance,  in  addition  to  a 
compensatory effect (when a lack of internal university funds is compensated for by seeking 
third-party funding), a discouraging effect might also be observable. This effect would be 
particularly noticeable once the financial funding per chair drops to such a low level that the 
“sunk costs” that are incurred during the grant application process can no longer be recouped 
and are no longer justifiable. Submitting applications for research grants would then no longer 
be worthwhile, regardless of the reduced availability of funds. And, of course, there are also 
interacting effects with other factors that would also have to be taken into consideration. For 
example, the lower the application acceptance rate at the SNSF, the sooner this discouraging 
effect is likely to set in. A discouraging effect could also be expected if the sunk costs of 
submitting an application are very high. Such a constellation would certainly appear plausible 
at Division I
3, for example. This is because, in addition to the unfavourable ratio of faculty to 
students in the corresponding disciplines at the universities and the low grant acceptance rates 
at the SNSF compared to other disciplines, the demands placed on the grant applicants have, 
according to expert opinions, also risen in recent years (leading to higher sunk costs as well).  
To summarize, it can be said that hypotheses on the influence exerted on the number of grant 
applications  submitted  to  the  SNSF  stemming  from  the  research  and  employment 
environments at Swiss universities cannot be clearly and unequivocally formulated from a 
theoretical standpoint and such hypotheses must, therefore, be empirically investigated. On 
the other hand, it is somewhat unlikely that the aforementioned, possibly dampening, effects 
on  the  number  of  grant  applications  could  be  so  strong  that  they  would  be  capable  of 
completely offsetting the amplification effects associated with the quantitative expansion of 
the tertiary system. It follows that not only the quantitative expansion of the tertiary system 
                                            
3 Individual disciplines are assigned to one of three Divisions at the Swiss National Science Foundation. An 
overview is given in the Appendix. Division I compromises mainly disciplines of the humanities and social 
sciences, Division II engineering, natural and exact sciences and Division III biology and the medical sciences.    3 
but also the changes underway with regard to the incentive systems throughout the research 
landscape and, ultimately, the tighter budgets for basic funding of universities would tend to 
increase demand for external research funding sources and, therefore, have a positive impact 
on the number of funding requests submitted to the SNSF.  
 
2.2.   Pull factors 
Turning to the factors attributable to operational and functional aspects of the Swiss National 
Science Foundation, a distinction can be made between three different kinds of pull factors. 
One comprises the other funding instruments of the SNSF (besides the normal individual 
project  grants)  that  could  have  an  interactive  effect  on  the  grants  awarded  for  individual 
research projects in the Divisions I, II and III. Secondly, although the SNSF’s capacity to 
promote research (defined by the total amount of financial resources available to it for grants) 
is determined by exogenous forces (i.e. in a political process), it does have some freedom 
(subject, of course, to substantial constraints) in appropriating these resources to the various 
Divisions and disciplinary groups, which, in turn, probably has an impact on the number of 
grant  applications  submitted  by  the  individual  disciplines.  Thirdly,  there  are  also  certain 
dynamic elements to be considered because the initial processing of grant applications and the 
probability that an application will be accepted can, to a certain extent, be anticipated, as can 
the amount of funding that is likely to be awarded. Therefore, these dynamic elements also 
have an impact on the behaviour of potential grant applicants. However, since these elements, 
for example the probability that an application will be accepted, are, in turn, influenced by the 
total number of grant applications submitted (the financial resources of the SNSF are not 
limitless), there is a dynamic interactive effect that, ultimately, has a co-determining influence 
on the number of applications submitted in the following observation period.  
 
a)  Alternative research funding instruments 
With regard to the alternative research funding instruments offered by the SNSF, the study 
focuses  on  the  following  three:  (1)  the  targeted  research  programmes  under  the  National 
Research Programme (NRP and SPP), (2) the National Centres of Competence in Research 
(NCCR) and (3) the SNSF Professorships. Theoretically, all three can influence the number of 
applications for individual project funding submitted in the Divisions I-III. The interactive 
effect  between  the  funding  instruments  and  the  applications  for  grants  is,  once  again, 
theoretically  unclear  and  ambiguous.  One  could  assume  that  fewer  applications  might  be 
submitted because of the alternative funding instruments, since researchers will be able to 
obtain funding from these alternative sources. This hypothesis would be particularly plausible 
under  the  presumption  that  the  alternative  funding  instruments,  especially  the  National 
Research  Programmes  (NRP),  have  a  certain  substitutive  effect  on  the  grant  applications 
submitted within the scope of normal project funding. Furthermore, this dampening effect will 
increase accordingly as researchers themselves discover that there are certain upper limits to 
the amount of research they can conduct, i.e. that they cannot simply increase their research 
activities at will. In such a situation research needs met through other sources would reduce 
the likelihood that “normal” requests for project funding would be submitted.  
On the other hand one could also posit a certain complementarity of the funding instruments. 
As a result of this complementarity, researchers who were successful in receiving funding 
through one instrument would only then have access to resources enabling them to further 
increase their research capacity and also to generate new research ideas in the process. In such 
a situation one could imagine that researchers working on a project in a NRP are, by virtue of   4 
this involvement, encouraged to present new funding requests for individual project funding 
and that they can do so much more easily. With this complementarity, the expansion of the 
alternative  funding  instruments  would  not  lead  to  a  decrease  in  the  number  of  grant 
applications submitted, but rather a continued increase.  
With  regard  to  the  alternative  funding  instruments,  an  empirical  investigation  was  only 
possible with the NRPs, for various reasons. The SNF Professorships and the NCCR have not 
existed  long  enough  to  permit  exogenous  variables  to  be  generated  that  allow  for  clear, 
unequivocal  conclusions.  The  projects  in  the  SPP  programmes  were  not  taken  into 
consideration because the variance of this variable was too small to serve as an explanation 
for the fluctuations in the number of funding requests in the individual discipline groups.  
 
b)  Approved grant applications  
Our second hypothesis pertains to the relation between the amount of grants awarded per 
discipline group in year t-1 and the number of requests submitted in year t. This relation 
should be positive under the assumption that the researchers will take note, either directly 
(through their own experiences) or indirectly (through other researchers or information from 
the SNSF), of any increase in the amount of funding available. In other words, an increase in 
funds earmarked for research grants serves as an incentive to submit more requests for grants 
in the subsequent period. The decisive point here is the hope that the greater amount of funds 
available will have increased the probability of having a grant application accepted. However, 
an increase in grant monies in the preceding period could just as well lead to a decline in the 
number of grant applications submitted in the subsequent period if a discipline is unable to 
quickly increase the number of funding applications it produces. This is because in the given 
situation an increase in research funding during the preceding period would have a saturation 
effect. A decline in grant monies in the preceding period could conceivably lead to either 
effect, depending on whether one postulates discouragement or compensation as the response 
from the researchers.  
The changes in grant monies awarded is analyzed per discipline group since it can be assumed 
that, from a researchers’ point of view, only the data on discipline group to which they belong 
is of relevance.  
 
c)  Dynamic feedback effects  
The decision-making situation of a researcher contemplating whether to submit an application 
for a research grant can be briefly described as follows: An application will be submitted only 
if the net benefit of the research project is positive, i.e., if the benefit is greater than the cost 
associated with the process of applying for a research project grant. The latter includes the 
effort required to conceive and design a project, i.e., all resources that must be invested in the 
project grant application. The benefit will also depend on the probability that the application 
will  be  accepted  and,  in  the  event  it  is  accepted,  on  the  amount  of  funding  that  will  be 
provided for the research project, while the costs of submitting the application are sunk costs, 
regardless of the presumed chances of acceptance.  
Three  different  types  of  response  patterns  can  be  expected  given  the  decision-making 
situation described above.  
   5 
￿  A Type 1 response pattern would be practically no reaction in the number of funding 
requests  to  changes  in  the  expected  acceptance  rate  and  the  degree  of  funding 
provided. This could be attributable to various reasons. One would have to assume, 
however, that the decision-making situation for Type 1 researchers is a 0-1 decision, 
meaning  that  the  decision  is  whether  to  submit  a  project  proposal  or  not  and  not 
whether  to  submit  more  or  less  proposals.  The  absence  of  any  response  can  be 
expected if there is deterioration in the aforementioned acceptance and funding rates 
that  does  reduce  the  net  benefit  but  this  net  benefit  is,  nevertheless,  still  clearly 
positive. Therefore, the likelihood of submitting an application does not change much 
because the 0-1 decision is still be in favor of submitting an application. The expected 
effect of changes in acceptance probability and the degree of financing provided is 
accordingly marginal and probably not statistically significant.  
￿  A Type 2 response pattern would be researchers who reap either a relatively small 
benefit  from  a  research  project  and/or  for  whom  the  costs  of  submitting  a  grant 
application are relatively high. In the event the benefit was already close to nil prior to 
any deterioration in the acceptance probability and degree of funding provided, we 
would expect that a reduction in these rates would bring the net benefit into a negative 
range. We refer to this response type as a “case of discouragement.” Any deterioration 
in  the  general  funding  conditions  at  the  research  promoting  agencies  would 
immediately discourage these researchers from submitting a funding request in the 
first place.  
￿  Type 3 has a similar starting situation as Type 1 above, i.e., the net benefit prior to any 
change in rates is clearly in positive territory. In addition to the assumptions made for 
the Type 1 model, however, we assume that Type 3 researchers are aware of not only 
the  net  benefit  of  an  individual  research  project  but  also  of  their  overall  research 
output.  If  the  net  benefit  of  one  single  application  declines  due  to  the  greater 
probability that the application will be rejected and because less funding per grant is 
offered, these researchers will feel compelled to compensate for the reduced benefit 
per application by submitting more applications. Only by doing so can they maintain 
the overall benefit of their aggregate research activity at the same level as before. This 
would be a “case of compensation”, meaning that the reduced expected benefit of a 
single  grant  application  will  have  to  be  compensated  for  by  submitting  more 
applications.  This  type  of  response  is  expected  if,  for  example,  existing  research 
infrastructure can only be maintained by having a continual flow of research activity. 
Such situations can also arise if individual research projects are more or less follow-up 
projects within a broader, continuing research programme; a disruption in the research 
chain would have negative effects on the entire research output in the long term. 
 
Our operationalization of the acceptance rates and funding rates is based on the assumption 
that researchers’ expectations will be extrapolative or adaptive. This means that the behaviour 
of researchers at the point t in time will respond to the given rates at the point t-1 in time.  
Type 3 is the most likely of the three aforementioned response patterns to trigger a dynamic 
response chain. Assuming the amount of funds appropriated to the SNSF remains practically 
unchanged, and the number of grant applications in year t increases due to an exogenous 
effect, then the acceptance and funding rates  would recede in  year t. This would compel 
researchers  to  submit  more  grant  applications  in  year  t+1  (compensation),  which,  ceteris 
paribus, would cause the rates in year t+1 to recede once again in comparison with year t. 
This, in turn, would lead to a further increase in grant applications in year t+2 and so on.   6 
3.  Experience abroad  
 
As  expected,  a  brief  review  of  the  literature  confirms  that  there  is  virtually  no  research 
literature on this specific issue. No investigation of this subject matter has been documented 
in the theoretical or the empirical literature; so far only the effects of the general institutional 
environment and incentive systems on individual research activities have been investigated, 
and only in a few studies describing the research activities of individual researchers. These 
papers  are  of  little  interest  with  regard  to  the  specific  question  as  to  why  more  grant 
applications might be submitted to a particular research funding agency. Inquiries addressed 
to  foreign  institutions  that  are  comparable  to  the  SNSF  were  answered  in  Germany  and 
Austria. In Germany, the German Research Foundation (DFG) reported a growing number of 
funding requests in its individual grants programme. As a result of this increase, the DFG 
lowered its acceptance rate, which declined on average from 68.4% in 1995 to 46.3% in 2004. 
In  Austria,  the  Austrian  Science  Fund  (FWF)  reported  that  the  number  of  requests  for 
individual grants had not risen very much but the amount of funding requested per proposal 
had.  The  FWF  reacted  to  this  development  by  turning  down  a  greater  percentage  of  the 
requests submitted and its acceptance rate consequently declined from approximately 60% to 
36.2% during the 1995-2004 period.  
In both cases, however, there had been no investigations made, in order to analyse the reasons 
for the increased funding requests or the amount of funding requested. 
An interesting note in both of these cases is that the pressure on the two research promotion 
agencies stemming from the growing number of grant applications was met primarily by an 
increase in their refusal rates rather than a reduction in the amount of money provided per 
application (see also section 4). Due to the hypotheses formulated in section 2, one would 
have to presume that the constant reduction in the probability that an  application will be 
accepted would still contribute to an increase in the number of applications submitted if the 
costs of submitting an application “sunk costs” were not prohibitively high. 
 
 
4.  Database, operationalizations and limitations 
 
4.1.  Data specification for the dependent variable 
The  variable  to  be  explained  in  the  following  analyses  is  the  total  number  of  grant 
applications  submitted  to  the  SNSF  Divisions  I  to  III.  The  analysis  is  limited  to  project 
requests. It does not cover other types of requests, such as applications for personal grants or 
conference grants.   
Request statistics are generated twice a year. A spring and an autumn figure hence exist for 
each year. These two figures were used to calculate an annual rate. It would be possible in 
theory to combine the autumn figure in the year t-1 with the spring figure in t, since these 
might be exposed to the same influences in terms of time. Another possibility would be to 
combine  the  spring  and  autumn  values  in  year  t  to  produce  an  annual  figure.  Both 
specifications were tested and yielded fairly similar trends in terms of the annual figures. 
Hence, we are opting for the specification which adds up the two values from the same year. 
This also facilitates interpretation of the coefficients of the independent variables.    7 
A vigorous and unusually linear increase in grant applications as from 2001 can be observed, 
in particular with regard to Division I discipline groups. The SNSF has furnished us with 
explanations for this major trend, which, however, we were unable to test on a quantitative 
basis.
4 We therefore attempted to take this trend into account by means of a specific control 
variable. This variable explores whether there was a significant trend for the post-2000 period, 
with particular reference to grant applications from Division I, which both differs from the 
trend prevailing in the 1990s and is also stronger than the trend for Divisions II and III.  
 
4.2  Grouping in terms of the dependent variable 
Two  specifications  for  dependent  variables  were  set  up  for  empirical  analysis.  The  first 
specification is based on the discipline groups and the second is based on the inputting tertiary 
institutions  (including  the  Swiss  Federal  Institutes  of  Technology  in  Zurich  {ETH},  and 
Lausanne {EPFL}, respectively).  
 
a)   By discipline group 
The first specification allows the broadest dataset and also takes account of the fact that the 
request  figures  in  the  individual  disciplines  may  be  subject  to  very  different  exogenous 
influences. This process enabled the creation of a panel covering 285 observations, at best. 
The panel is based on  19 discipline groups  yielding a value in  each  case over  a 15-year 
period. The basic criterion for setting up a panel with all discipline groups is the assumption 
that  the  request  figures  for  the  various  discipline  groups  are  not  interlinked  or  correlated 
(although they may of course be subject to the same exogenous influences). Although this 
assumption might not apply one hundred percent, it is nevertheless appropriate because it is 
hard to assume that the number of requests in one particular discipline might influence the 
requests in another discipline. Naturally, due to the difficulty in drawing demarcation lines, 
there may be cases in which this assumption does not always apply – especially with regard to 
divisions II and III, for example when discipline groups are redefined and grant applications 
that were formerly in Group x now count as belonging to Group y. This would bring about a 
causal  negative  correlation  between  the  two  disciplines  that  would  not  be  explainable  by 
exogenous factors.  
The  hypotheses  in  section  2  showed  that,  based  on  theoretical  reasoning,  individual 
disciplines or discipline groups are likely to react very differently to exogenous effects, not 
only in extent but also in terms of the direction of response. Setting up panels for discipline 
groups  is  a  suitable  basis  for  estimating  such  effects  separately  for  discipline  groups 
(divisions).  
 
                                            
4 These explanations are mainly about the expiry of SPP projects and the initiation of the NCCR; none of the 
disciplines in Division I received funding during the first round of the NCCR’s but the SPP covered well the 
humanities and social sciences. These two effects might naturally have resulted in more requests mounting up in 
Division I.    8 
b)  By  tertiary  education  institution  (i.e.,  conventional  university  and  Swiss  Federal 
Institutes of Technology 
As well as classification on the basis of discipline groups, grant applications may of course 
also  be  categorized  in  terms  of  the  institutions  from  which  the  applications  come.  The 
assumption of independence between the various groups in terms of the dependent variable is 
probably even more applicable when specifying in terms of educational facility rather than in 
terms of discipline groups, which makes specification unproblematic. The variable is made up 
of  grant  applications  involving  universities  and  the  two  ETHs.  The  new  universities  of 
Lucerne and Lugano have not been included among the universities because they were not yet 
a significant factor during the period of observation. This gives a panel of eight conventional 
universities and two Federal Institutes of Technology, and encompasses a period of 15 years, 
yielding a maximum N of 150 in terms of the dependent variables.  
Basically, it would be reasonable to assume that, given the research setting, researchers in the 
same discipline would react identically or similarly to exogenous effects, and that affiliation 
to  a  particular  institution  would  not  necessarily  be  the  crucial  criterion.  However,  this 
assumption  does  not  apply  where  university-specific  incentive  systems  exist.  As  long  as 
universities differ in this respect on a structural basis, these differences are taken into account 
by the dummy variables for the individual institutions (fixed effects) even if a discipline-
based panel is set up. So why is it necessary to set up an institution-specific panel? There is 
one main reason, and it involves the difference in data structure for SNSF data and Swiss 
Federal Statistical Office (SFSO) data (see 4.4). Transfer of the SFSO’s university-specific 
statistics  to  an  SNSF  nomenclature  on  a  discipline  basis  gives  a  very  imprecise  picture, 
whereas classification by institution is naturally much easier. Therefore, factoring exogenous 
variables from the university domain into estimates for discipline groups runs the risk of 
generating results that do not reflect true-life correlations, but are merely a consequence of 
imprecise data matching.  
The institution-specific analyses also go on to explore whether the conventional universities 
as a group show different trends and respond differently to exogenous variables than do the 
two federal institutions, the ETHs.  
There are two main reasons for this approach. Firstly, it can be assumed that the research and 
research  funding  climate  at  the  ETHs  differs  from  the  climate  prevailing  at  the  cantonal 
universities, which might result in a situation where the incentive for researchers to submit 
SNSF grant applications is much higher at ETHs than at cantonal universities. Secondly, an 
unusually high increase in the number of full-time professorships can be seen for the ETHs 
starting from 2000. Although this trend requires further explanation, it automatically has a 
major influence on all exogenous variables related to the number of professorships. 
 
4.3.  Exogenous variables from the SNSF area 
With regard to the variables from the National Foundation’s sphere of influence, three groups 
of exogenous variables were created for the analysis, after tests showed that these groups have 
a high explanatory value.  
The simplest solution was to operationalise the variables emerging from the number of grant 
applications submitted and the level of funding applied for, and the number of applications 
actually approved and grant monies actually awarded.  
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a)  Acceptance rates and degree of funding 
In terms of the acceptance rate, a significantly negative trend over time in all three divisions is 
easy to detect by descriptive means alone. Thus, the acceptance rate is virtually a mirror 
image of the increasing numbers of applications. This is because there was an upper limit to 
the  resources  available  to  the  SNSF,  and  the  only  response  to  an  increasing  number  of 
requests was a higher refusal rate. Analysis of the degree of funding of the approved projects 
over time clearly shows that the limited resources were not simply distributed among a larger 
number of projects, which would have been possible but would not have been rational from a 
research policy point of view.  
 
b)  Total approved sums broken down by discipline group 
This variable comprises the total approved amounts per discipline group. This variable was 
operationalised  as  the  rate  of  change  versus  the  previous  year.  Hence,  the  impact  of  this 
variable  can  be  investigated  without  the  impact  of  differences  in  the  levels  of  approved 
amounts between the disciplines. 
 
c)  National research programmes (NRP) 
It is more difficult to operationalise the exogenous variables, which are intended to reflect the 
alternative funding instruments of the SNSF. Various operationalization options are available, 
and various specifications were tested for that reason. The table below shows the version 
ultimately  used  in  the  empirical  analyses.  As  far  as  operationalization  is  concerned,  it  is 
important to investigate the impact of NRPs on individual project funding such that the start, 
run time, and end of an NRP may produce a different effect on project requests. This is 
because a certain compensatory effect on other project requests is most likely to occur during 
an NRP, whereas at the start of an NRP, both a compensatory response and a stimulation of 
“normal”  project  submissions  would  be  conceivable.  Thus,  it  is  conceivable  that  project 
submissions refused for an NRP, because they did not have exactly the right subject area, later 
re-appear via individual project submissions in the Divisions I-III. Upon completion of an 
NRP, two effects are possible. On the one hand, in the course of a project in an NRP, new 
project ideas might be generated which would boost the number of project requests at the end 
of the NRP. On the other hand, people completing an NRP project (for example as part of the 
doctoral programme of the persons concerned) might be more inclined to engage in evaluation 
work based on the completed paper and hence have fewer resources for starting other projects, 
which would tend to reduce the number of research funding applications.  
 
 
Table 1:  Operationalization of variables for an NRP 
 
Duration of an NRP  -  x  x  x  x  -  - 
Variable 1 (beginning)  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Variable 2 (middle)  0  1  1  1  1  0  0 
Variable 3 (end)  0  0  0  0  1  1  0 
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The variables were specified such that all discipline groups are each allocated three dummy 
variables if an NRP applied to the subjects covered by the discipline group. Two variants 
were tested for Variable 2. One variant always assumed a value of 1 when an NRP was in 
progress for the respective discipline. The other specification added up the NRPs of relevance 
to the discipline. In the empirical analyses, the first specification had the greatest explanatory 
value, which was why the first type of operationalization was used.  
 
4.4.  Exogenous variables from the tertiary institution area 
a) Expansion of the tertiary education system 
Operationalization of the variables from the tertiary institution area was associated with three 
major problems, the first of which put the greatest constraints on the analysis options. The 
table below shows that the Swiss Federal Statistical Office’s system for classifying academic 
disciplines differs from that of the SNSF. 
 
Table 2:  Comparison of SNSF and SFSO systems for classifying academic disciplines 
   SNSF classification       SFSO classification 
Philosophy, religious studies and educational sciences  Theology 





History  Historical + cultural studies 
Archaeology, ethnology,  urban studies  Historical + cultural studies 
Language and literature  Language + literature 
Mathematics  Exact science 
Astronomy  Exact science 
Chemistry  Science 
Physics  Exact science 
Engineering  Construction + geodesy   
Mechanical and electrical engineering 
Environmental studies  Science 
Geography  Science 
Basic biological science  Science 
General biology  Science 
Agricultural science + forestry 
Basic medical science  Medicine 
Experimental medicine  Medicine 
Clinical medicine  Medicine 
Veterinary medicine 
Preventive medicine  Medicine 
Social medicine  Medicine 
 
The consequence of the nomenclatural incompatibility is that matching the SFSO figures to 
each of the 19 SNSF disciplines produces a fairly undifferentiated picture.  
A second problem concerns the operationalization of the variable “finances per university.” 
Since this data is available only for the period since 1995, analysis based on this variable can 
only extend back to 1995, strictly speaking. However, this would reduce the volume of data to 
an extent that would impact on the outcomes. Therefore, it was decided to use constructs as a 
basis for elaborating data for the pre-1995 period.  
The third problem concerns the professorship statistics. As already mentioned, the ETHs saw 
an unusual increase in the number of professorships from 2000 onward. Further, the statistics 
of the Federal Statistical Office show that the professorships allocated to Division III were 
subject to structural disruption between 1995 and 1996. These ruptures indicate that the SFSO 
reshuffled  professorships  and  classified  them  to  different  disciplines  during  this  period.   11 
Because  this  effect  has  an  impact  on  all  variables  elaborated  with  the  variable 
“professorships”, a regrouping of these professorships was attempted, on the assumption that 
the post-1995 classification is the correct one. Pre-1995 trends in the individual discipline 
groups were therefore adjusted to the 1996 level in each case. This more or less precludes any 
structural rupture in the variables. Regrouping was not necessary for the analysis of request 
figures per tertiary institution because regrouping mainly pertains to discipline groups and has 
practically no influence on the analyses per tertiary institution.  
 
b)  Policy changes impacting on research activities  
It was also intended to operationalise the possible changes in the framework conditions for 
research activities at universities (incentive systems, appointments policy, etc.). To this end, 
discussions took place with senior management personnel from almost all Swiss universities. 
These talks confirmed that there had certainly been changes in framework conditions during 
the period of observation, but it was not usually possible to date these changes to specific 
years.  This  information  therefore  produced  no  workable  variables  for  the  empirical  part. 
Hence, although such policy changes may well affect the numbers of funding applications 
submitted, this association is impossible to pinpoint. Consequently, any growth triggered by 
such changes would manifest as a trend with no precise explanation.  
 
 
5.  Estimation methods 
 
The statistical method employed here for empirical evaluation is panel estimation. The panel 
structure is composed of a cross section of 19 disciplines / 10 universities and a longitudinal 
section of 15 years.
5 Hetereoscedasticity was controlled for, which is an obvious step in view 
of the differently sized groups of applications in the individual disciplines and universities. 
An AR(1) term was used for correction of longitudinal autocorrelation.  
In all our estimates, we use dummies for the individual years and individual discipline groups 
/ individual tertiary education institutions. This approach allows us to correct for unobserved 
structural  differences  between  the  years,  the  disciplines  and  the  tertiary  institutions,  and 
reduces the risk of misinterpreting outliers in the years, disciplines or tertiary institutions and 
misreading them as trends or other correlations.  
 
 
6.  Empirical evaluations 
 
For  the  reasons  mentioned  above,  empirical  evaluation  proceeds  as  follows:  Wherever 
possible,  estimates  are  made  on  the  basis  of  the  dataset  of  applications  according  to  the 
individual discipline groups. This enables the use of the most extensive and differentiated 
dataset. However, it also means that, for this data, the exogenous variables from the tertiary 
institution area cannot be taken into account (because of the definition problems mentioned 
                                            
5 All estimates were done using the econometric program Stata 8.0.  
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above). The variables from the tertiary institution area (see 6.3.) are therefore only used for 
the analyses pertaining to request figures per tertiary institution. It is therefore impossible to 
present a combined explanatory model with data from the SNSF and tertiary institutions. For 
all calculations, the dependent variable (number of applications) was used in a logarithmized 
form.  Accordingly,  the  coefficients  of  the  independent  variables  are  to  be  interpreted  as 
percent changes in the number of applications.  
 
6.1.  Trend 
The purpose of the first empirical test is to see if any statistically significant trend whatsoever 
can be identified for the observation period from 1990 to 2004. In this process, as mentioned 
above, fixed effects will be estimated for the individual discipline groups and for each year, 
i.e.  a  trend  will  be  identified  as  significant  only  if  the  movements  in  the  numbers  of 
applications cannot be explained by individual discipline effects or year effects. The results, 
i.e. the coefficients, are read such that a change in the independent variable, i.e. in this case, 
the trend, of 1 (i.e., one  year) changes the dependent variable (the  grant applications per 
discipline group) by x percent. 
 
Table 3:  Trend  estimates  (fixed  effects  for  years  and  discipline  groups);  dependent 
  variable: number of grant applications (logarithmized) by discipline group; 
coefficients x100 
Coefficients  Estimate 1  Estimate 2  Estimate 3 
Trend 1990-2004  3.22***     
Trend 1990-2000    1.87***   
Trend 2001-2004    14.06***   
Trend 1990-2000 Division I      2.65*** 
Trend 1990-2000 Division II      1.67*** 
Trend 1990-2000 Division III      1.73*** 
Trend 2001-2004 Division I      22.26*** 
Trend 2001-2004 Division II      14.39*** 
Trend 2001-2004 Division III      9.45*** 
N  285  285  285 
N groups  19  19  19 
Time periods  15  15  15 
Wald chi(.)  31567.7  31567.7  27104.47 
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000 
*, **, *** stand for a 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance, respectively. The estimates are estimated for heteroscedastic 
panels with cross-sectional correlation. Autocorrelation is corrected with an AR(1) coefficient for all panels.  
 
If  one  estimates  a  linear  trend  for  the  period  of  observation  (Estimate  1),  then  the  grant 
applications submitted to the SNSF rose an annual 3.2%. Analysis of the numbers of grant 
applications  shows,  however,  that  this  trend  was  not  linear  because  the  strong  growth  in 
requests did not set in until after 2000, following a slight dip in 99/00. If one breaks the trend   13 
down into the two periods 1990-2000 and 2001-2004, one will see (Estimate 2) that, though a 
statistically significant trend was already in place in the first period, it was no higher than 
approximately 1.9%. Starting from 2001, the trend indicates an annual increase of more than 
14% in the number of requests. Basically, however, it is not easy to decide which of the two 
trend specifications is better, because the good fit of the linear trend could also be interpreted 
as indicating that the considerable increase in applications in the 2001 to 2004 period was 
simply a reaction to the decline seen in the previous two years.  
If you break the two trend periods down even further into divisions (Estimate 3), it again 
becomes clear that growth was mainly engendered by the disciplines in Division I. The trends 
in Divisions 2 and 3 are statistically significantly lesser than the trend in Division  I (for 
reasons of space, the tests are not shown here), but are also statistically significantly different 
from zero and in the positive range. The next step is therefore to explore whether these trends 
can be partly or wholly explained by other variables. 
 
6.2.  Connections between variables in the SNSF area 
a)  Acceptance rate 
In Table 4 below, the first variable to be tested as an explanatory variable is the acceptance 
rate for applications per discipline.  
 
Table 4:  Application acceptance rate (+trends);  
Dependent variable: number of grant applications  
(logarithmized) by discipline groups; coefficients x 100 
Coefficients  Estimate 1  Estimate 2 
Acceptance rate (Year t-1)  -0.11   
Acceptance rate Division I (Year t-1)    0.33*** 
Acceptance rate Division II (Year t-1)    -0.52*** 
Acceptance rate Division III (Year t-1)    -0.10 
Trend 1990-2000 Division I  1.15**  2.03*** 
Trend 1990-2000 Division II  0.71**  0.50** 
Trend 1990-2000 Division III  0.33  0.80 
Trend 2001-2004 Division I  16.01***  20.15*** 
Trend 2001-2004 Division II  10.45***  7.42*** 
Trend 2001-2004 Division III  3.88***  3.59 
N  266  266 
N groups  19  19 
Time periods  14  14 
Wald chi(.)  10476.80  16888.10 
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000 
*, **, *** stand for a 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance, respectively. The estimates are estimated 
for heteroscedastic panels with cross-sectional correlation. Autocorrelation is corrected with an AR(1) 
coefficient for all panels.  
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The acceptance rate is taken from the year t-1 and, pursuant to the hypothesis, should have an 
impact on the number of applications in year t. Estimate 1 shows no significant effect for the 
acceptance rate across all disciplines. However, if one breaks down the effect by divisions, 
significant effects are disclosed for Divisions I and II, the direction being inverse in either 
case. In contrast, the disciplines in Division III do not seem to react significantly to the rate of 
acceptance of applications.  
Pursuant  to  the  hypotheses  in  section  4,  what  one  observes  in  Division  I  is  an 
encouragement/discouragement effect, whereas  the effect one observes  in Division  II is a 
compensatory effect. In other words, the number of applications in Division I declines in 
response to a declining acceptance rate (and rises in response to a rising acceptance rate), 
while, in Division II disciplines, a decline in the acceptance rate prompts an increase in the 
number of applications. Hence, Division II disciplines seek to offset a lower probability of 
having a request accepted by submitting more applications the following year.  
 
b)  Degree of funding 
Similarly to the exploration of the impact of the acceptance rate, this section looks at how the 
degree of funding of prior grant applications affects the number of applications subsequently 
submitted.  
 
Table 5:  Degree of funding of grant applications (+trends);  
Dependent variable: number of grant applications  
(logarithmized) by discipline group; coefficients  x 100 
Coefficients  Estimate 1  Estimate 2 
Degree of funding (Year t-1)  -0.74***   
Degree of funding Division I (Year t-1)    -0.42*** 
Degree of funding Division II (Year t-1)    -0.32 
Degree of funding Division III (Year t-1)    -0.61*** 
Trend 1990-2000 Division I  1.60***  1.50*** 
Trend 1990-2000 Division II  0.57**  0.60** 
Trend 1990-2000 Division III  1.01***  1.20*** 
Trend 2001-2004 Division I  15.85***  15.91*** 
Trend 2001-2004 Division II  8.05***  8.07*** 
Trend 2001-2004 Division III  5.44***  6.15*** 
N  266  266 
N groups  19  19 
Time periods  14  14 
Wald chi(.)  15806.35  16354.10 
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000 
*,  **,  ***  stand  for  a  10%,  5%  and  1%  level  of  significance,  respectively.  The  estimates  are 
estimated for heteroscedastic panels with cross-sectional correlation. Autocorrelation is corrected 
with an AR(1) coefficient for all panels. 
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Across all disciplines, an increase in the degree of funding (Estimate 1) has a significantly 
negative  effect  on  the  number  of  applications  submitted  in  the  subsequent  year.  In  other 
words, all disciplines would react to a reduction in the degree of funding of their applications 
in year t-1 by increasing their applications in year t. Broken down by division, this effect is 
strongest  in  Division  III.  The  discipline  groups  in  Division  II  do  not  show  a  significant 
reaction to a change in the degree of funding.  
 
c)  Approved grant applications 
The next exogenous variable to be investigated is the grant monies awarded per discipline 
group. This variable is defined as the percent change in approved amounts from t-2 to t-1 per 
discipline group.  
 
Table 6:  Approved amounts (x1000) for grant applications (+trends);  
Dependent variable: number of grant applications  
(logarithmized) by discipline groups; coefficients x 100 
Coefficients  Estimate 1  Estimate 2 
Approved amounts (Year t-1/t-2)  -0.17***   
Approved amounts Division I (Year t-1/t-2)    -1.30*** 
Approved amounts Division II (Year t-1/t-2)    -0.63* 
Approved amounts Division III (Year t-1/t-2)    1.42*** 
Trend 1990-2000 Division I  1.60***  1.16*** 
Trend 1990-2000 Division II  0.74***  0.90*** 
Trend 1990-2000 Division III  0.43  -0.00 
Trend 2001-2004 Division I  18.31***  17.04*** 
Trend 2001-2004 Division II  9.74***  11.32*** 
Trend 2001-2004 Division III  4.55**  2.73 
N  247  247 
N groups  19  19 
Time periods  13  13 
Wald chi(.)  128034.26  14273.41 
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000 
*,  **,  ***  stand  for  a  10%,  5%  and  1%  level  of  significance,  respectively.  The  estimates  are 
estimated for heteroscedastic panels with cross-sectional correlation. Autocorrelation is corrected 
with an AR(1) coefficient for all panels. 
 
An increase in approved amounts has a negative effect on the number of grant applications 
across all discipline groups and in all departments, but, as already seen for the acceptance 
rate, the effects differ from one division to another. If there is an increase in the approved 
amounts in the Division I discipline groups, this lowers the number of applications submitted 
in the next period. In other words, a kind of short-term saturation effect is observed. This 
effect might be explained thus: when more applications have been approved, these need to be 
“researched” before new applications can be submitted. A similar but weaker reaction can be   16 
observed for the discipline groups in Division II. In contrast, the Division III discipline groups 
display a contrary response in terms of this variable. If the approved amounts increase, the 
number of requests submitted in the next period also increases, i.e. positive growth in terms of 
the amounts approved “whets the appetite for more” among these discipline groups. 
 
d)  National Research Programmes (NRPs) 
Various specifications were subjected to empirical testing for the exogenous variables that 
describe the funding instrument of the NRPs. A detailed description will be provided only of 
the particular model that proved to be significant. The table shows that, in a simple test of 
NRP variables, at least the two variables describing the run-time (middle) of an NRP and 
marking the end of an NRP are significant. The effects are negative throughout, i.e. you can 
assume that an NRP which covers one of the 19 discipline groups significantly lowers the 
number of grant applications in this discipline group. For reasons of comparison, the table 
again gives the outcome of the first trend estimate. This comparison is intended to show that, 
despite  the  subduing  effect  of  NRPs  on  the  number  of  applications,  there  is  no  major 
downturn in divisional trends.  
 
Table 7:  National Research Programmes (NRPs)(x100) (+Trends);  
Dependent variable: number of grant applications (logarithmized) by 
discipline groups; coefficients x100 
Coefficients  Estimate 1  Estimate 2 
NRP (start)  -2.77   
NRP (middle)  -3.87**   
NRP (end)  -3.23**   
Trend 1990-2000 Division I  2.90***  2.65*** 
Trend 1990-2000 Division II  1.70***  1.67*** 
Trend 1990-2000 Division III  1.83***  1.73*** 
Trend 2001-2004 Division I  22.79***  22.26*** 
Trend 2001-2004 Division II  14.00***  14.39*** 
Trend 2001-2004 Division III  9.79***  9.45*** 
N  285  285 
N Groups  19  19 
Time periods  15  15 
Wald chi(.)  15399.84  27104.47 
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000 
*,  **,  ***  stand  for  a  10%,  5%  and  1%  level  of  significance,  respectively.  The  estimates  are 
estimated for heteroscedastic panels with cross-sectional correlation. Autocorrelation is corrected 
with an AR(1) coefficient for all panels. 
 
e)  Combined effects 
Whereas exogenous variables were tested individually in the foregoing tables, it is always 
prudent to assume that the exogenous variables might also display intercorrelations; hence, a   17 
model that tests all variables together need not always disclose the same effects. However, the 
collective  model  produces  similar  outcomes  in  almost  all  respects  as  compared  with  the 
individual tests of the exogenous variables, apart from minor differences in the significances.  
 
Table 8:  Exogenous variables from the SNSF area (+trends);  
Dependent variable: number of grant applications  
(logarithmized) by discipline groups; coefficients x100 
Coefficients  Estimate 1  Estimate 2 
NRP (Start)  -3.13**   
NRP (Middle)  -5.74***   
NRP (End)  -7.28***   
Approved amounts Division I (Year t-1/t-2)  -1.93***   
Approved amounts Division II (Year t-1/t-2)  0.13   
Approved amounts Division III (Year t-1/t-2)  2.03***   
Degree of funding Division I (Year t-1)  -0.58**   
Degree of funding Division II (Year t-1)  -0.08   
Degree of funding Division III (Year t-1)  -0.19   
Acceptance rate Division I (Year t-1)  0.72***   
Acceptance rate Division II (Year t-1)  -1.07***   
Acceptance rate Division III (Year t-1)  -0.618**   
Trend 1990-2000 Division I  2.65***  2.65*** 
Trend 1990-2000 Division II  0.16  1.67*** 
Trend 1990-2000 Division III  0.44  1.73*** 
Trend 2001-2004 Division I  23.5***  22.26*** 
Trend 2001-2004 Division II  3.52  14.39*** 
Trend 2001-2004 Division III  3.09***  9.45*** 
N  247  285 
N groups  19  19 
Time periods  13  15 
Wald chi(.)  6877.91  27104.47 
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000 
*,  **,  ***  stand  for  a  10%,  5%  and  1%  level  of  significance,  respectively.  The  estimates  are 
estimated for heteroscedastic panels with cross-sectional correlation. Autocorrelation is corrected 
with an AR(1) coefficient for all panels. 
 
While the funding instrument of the National Research Programmes (NRP) generally has the 
effect of reducing the number of requests, differences can be observed in particular between 
the Division I discipline groups and the other two divisions in terms of the other variables. 
Deterioration in the likelihood of receiving SNSF funding (acceptance rate and degree of 
funding) has  a discouraging effect in Division  I  and prompts a decline in the number of 
requests. Request levels in Divisions II and III do not react significantly to the degree of 
funding  (which  may  be  explained  by  the  possibility  of  availing  of  alternative  funding   18 
options), but a compensatory effect can be observed in terms of the acceptance rate. If the 
probability of having a request accepted declines, the response is to increase the number of 
applications submitted. Division I responds to approvals of applications in preceding periods 
with  a  saturation  reaction,  while  Division  III  responds  by  increasing  the  number  of 
applications still further. 
For comparison purposes, the trend estimate is again shown. The effects emerging from two 
different regressions are not directly comparable, but very marked changes can be seen with 
regard  to  the  significance  of  the  outcomes.  If  you  take  into  consideration  the  framework 
conditions for approval of grant applications, for the available and allocated funds, and for the 
other SNSF funding instruments, it seems that all these factors have no influence whatsoever 
on the request trend in Division I, i.e. they do not explain the trend. In contrast, no further 
significant effects can be discerned for Divisions II and III in the 1990s.  
Drawing an interim conclusion from analysis of the request figures by discipline group, it can 
be seen that the trend toward an increase in the number of grant applications is primarily 
determined by an unexplainable trend in terms of funding requests in Division I, while the 
increasing number of requests in Divisions  II and  III is  a reaction to deteriorating SNSF 
acceptance rates.  
 
6.3.  Correlations between type of tertiary educational institution and funding requests 
As stated,  analysis of correlations between tertiary  education institution variables and the 
number  of  applications  for  SNSF  funding  is  based  on  a  breakdown  by  institution.  This 
analysis includes the two ETHs and the universities (unis). Since we have legitimate doubts as 
to whether the ETH data is truly comparable to the university data, especially due to the heavy 
increase in professorships from 2000 onward and because of the difference in the thrust of 
research between the ETHs and cantonal universities, the exogenous influences are estimated 
separately for the universities and the ETHs by using interaction variables. 
 
a)  Trend 
 
Two things soon become apparent from the trend estimates: The first estimate shows that 
estimation  of  the  trends  in  two  periods  with  the  request  figures  grouped  according  to 
university yields approximately the same figures as estimation by discipline group, which 
would suggest that the analyses are comparable. The second estimate shows that, as was to be 
expected, the marked trend in the second period is mainly due to Division I disciplines; this 
can be seen from the fact that the ETHs do not display any such trend, because they do 
virtually no research in these disciplines.  
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Table 9:  Trends; dependent variable: number of grant applications  
(logarithmized) by tertiary education institution: coefficients x100 
Coefficients  Estimate 1  Estimate 2 
Trend 1990-2000  1.13***   
Trend 2001-2004  13.89***   
Trend 1990-2000 (unis)    1.07*** 
Trend 2001-2004 (unis)    13.21*** 
Trend 1990-2000 (ETHs)    1.18 
Trend 2001-2004 (ETHs)    3.53** 
N  140  140 
N groups  10  10 
Time periods  14  14 
Wald chi(.)  23664.78  27527.13 
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000 
*,  **,  ***  stand  for  a  10%,  5%  and  1%  level  of  significance,  respectively.  The  estimates  are 
estimated for heteroscedastic panels with cross-sectional correlation. Autocorrelation is corrected 
with an AR(1) coefficient for all panels. Years and universities are controlled for using dummy 
variables.  
 
b)   Number of professors 
The number of professors has a positive effect on the number of applications for research 
funding.  The  coefficient  in  estimate  1  is  to  be  interpreted  as  indicating  that  adding  one 
professor increases the number of requests by approximately 0.07%. Since the annual average 
number of applications in the observation period is slightly in excess of 1,000 applications, 
this means that one additional full professorship in the tertiary system would increase the 
number of applications submitted to the SNSF by 0.7. If the tertiary institutions are broken 
down into universities and ETHs, the significant effect for the ETHs is effaced, while the 
coefficient for the universities rises slightly. However, the former probably does not mean that 
the number of professorships is of no relevance to the submission of applications at the ETHs; 
rather, it is probably attributable to the fact that the number of ETH professorships is distorted 
because of special effects.  
  
Due to limited space, the analyses of student numbers are not given here. The results show 
that there is a time lag before a change in the number of students impacts on the number of 
grant applications. This shows that quantitative expansion of the tertiary education system is 
reflected a short time later in more professorships and hence in a higher requirement for 
research  funding.  The  effect  size  is  such  that  adding  100  students  results  in  1.25  more 
research requests five years later. The effect for the ETHs is around 3.5 times higher than for 
the  universities,  because  it  takes  considerably  fewer  additional  students  for  an  additional 
professorship  to  be  installed  at  the  ETHs  than  at  cantonal  universities  (again  with  the 
necessary limitations in terms of data quality). 
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Table 10:  Number of professors (+trends); dependent variable: number of grant 
Applications (logarithmized) by tertiary educational institution;  
coefficients x1000 
Coefficients  Estimate 1  Estimate 2 
Number of professors   0.72***   
Number of professors (unis)    0.84*** 
Number of professors (ETHs)    0.30 
Trend 1990-2000   0.99***  0.93*** 
Trend 2001-2004  12.85***  12.5*** 
N  140  140 
N Groups  10  10 
Time periods  14  14 
Wald chi(.)  15591.24  16887.29 
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000 
*,  **,  ***  stand  for  a  10%,  5%  and  1%  level  of  significance,  respectively.  The  estimates  are 
estimated for heteroscedastic panels with cross-sectional correlation. Autocorrelation is corrected 
with an AR(1) coefficient for all panels. Years and universities are controlled for using dummy 
variables.  
 
c)  Student-professor ratios 
The next analysis looks at the impact of the student-professor ratio on the number of requests 
for  funding.  The  specification  of  the  student-professor  ratio  does  not  distinguish  between 
cross-sectional and longitudinal effects.  
 
Table 11:  Student-professor ratios (+trends); dependent variable:  
Number of grant applications (logarithmized) by  
tertiary institution; coefficients x100 
Coefficients  Estimate 1  Estimate 2 
Student-professor ratio   -0.61**   
Student-professor ratio (unis)    -0.82*** 
Student-professor ratio (ETHs)    2.43** 
Trend 1990-2000   1.30***  1.35*** 
Trend 2001-2004  15.28***  15.74*** 
N  140  140 
N Groups  10  10 
Time periods  14  14 
Wald chi(.)  11258.74  9893.02 
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000 
*,  **,  ***  stand  for  a  10%,  5%  and  1%  level  of  significance,  respectively.  The  estimates  are 
estimated for heteroscedastic panels with cross-sectional correlation. Autocorrelation is corrected 
with an AR(1) coefficient for all panels. Years and universities are controlled for using dummy 
variables.    21 
This means that a poor student-professor ratio at one university as compared with another 
university might equally be the cause of a significant coefficient as a change in the student-
professor ratio over time. As might be expected, the effect is negative and significant. A 
deterioration in the student-professor ratio (more students per professorship) correlates with a 
decline in the number of requests. Because teaching takes up more time, less time remains to 
engage in research and submit research funding requests. The ETH coefficient should not be 
paid too much attention because it is likely to be heavily biased by the trends in the number of 
professorships as described above.  
 
d)  Funds per professorship 
Since overall funding (not including third-party funding) at the universities remained virtually 
unchanged since the mid-1990s in real terms, while the number of professorships rose slightly 
in most cases, the available university resources per professorship declined steadily in real 
terms. Based on the assumption that you might expect professors to be tempted to alleviate 
this trend and offset it by seeking external funding, the logical expectation would be for the 
reduction in funding per professorship to result in an increase in the number of applications 
for funding submitted to external agencies. This effect can be discerned overall and also for 
the universities and ETHs separately. 
 
Table 12:  Funds per professorship (+trends); dependent variable:  
Number of requests (logarithmized) by tertiary education institution  
Coefficients  Estimate 1  Estimate 2 
Funds per professorship   -1.87e-07***   
Funds per professorship (unis)    -1.27e-07*** 
Funds per professorship (ETHs)    -6.12e-08*** 
Trend 1990-2000   0.91***  0.99*** 
Trend 2001-2004  12.58***  12.80*** 
N  140  140 
N groups  10  10 
Time periods  14  14 
Wald chi(.)  28100.99  18697.27 
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000 
*,  **,  ***  stand  for  a  10%,  5%  and  1%  level  of  significance,  respectively.  The  estimates  are 
estimated for heteroscedastic panels with cross-sectional correlation. Autocorrelation is corrected 
with an AR(1) coefficient for all panels. Years and universities are controlled for using dummy 
variables.  
 
e)  Combined model 
Having found significant effects for three groups of exogenous variables, what is of interest 
now is to explore whether these variables – which are inter-correlated – all remain significant 
in a collective model. It immediately becomes clear that the number of professors cannot be 
tested  simultaneously  with  the  other  variables  in  a  single  model,  because  the  other  two 
variables themselves depend on trends in terms of the number of professorships. Moreover, 
the  coefficients  of  the  ETH  variables  cannot  be  included  in  the  analysis  because  these   22 
coefficients are unreliable owing to the aforementioned data trends in the ETH area, and, in 
point of fact, are no longer significant in the calculations.  
It  can  be  concluded  from  the  combined  model  that  expansion  of  the  tertiary  educational 
system impacts on research funding in the form of two contrary influences. On the one hand, 
the deterioration in the student-teacher ratios at the universities has subdued the submission of 
requests, while on the other hand the reduction in the funds available per professorship at the 
universities has raised the pressure to acquire third-party funding. These offset each other to 
the  extent  that  they  do  not  suffice  to  explain  the  rising  trend  in  terms  of  the  number  of 
requests  observable  as  from  the  year  2000.  A  genuine  mass  effect  –  where  more  grant 
applications are submitted because more researchers are active in the system – cannot be 
discerned, because a mass effect of this kind is counteracted by the trend apparent in terms of 
university finances and due to a time delay in the setting up of new professorships in the 
presence of a rising number of students. 
 
Table 13:  All exogenous variables (+trends); dependent variable: 
number of grant applications (logarithmized) by tertiary 
educational institution 
Coefficients  Estimate 
Student-professor ratio (unis) (x100)  -0.83*** 
Student-professor ratio (ETHs) (x100)  2.81 
Funds per professorship (unis)  -1.49e-07*** 
Funds per professorship (ETHs)  -2.91e-08 
Trend 1990-2000 (unis)  1.11*** 
Trend 2001-2004 (unis)  14.18*** 
Trend 1990-2000 (ETHs)  0.86 
Trend 2001-2004 (ETHs)  2.67 
N  140 
N Groups  10 
Time periods  14 
Wald chi(.)  9104.29 
Prob > chi2  0.000 
*, **, *** stand for a 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
The estimates are estimated for heteroscedastic panels with cross-sectional 
correlation. Autocorrelation is corrected with an AR(1) coefficient for all 
panels. Years and universities are controlled for using dummy variables. 
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7.  Conclusions  
 
The empirical analysis of the determinants of the factors influencing the demand for research 
grants  shows  that  the  institutional  features  and  the  funding  mechanisms  of  the  funding 
agencies play a prominent role as well as the expansion, the financing and governance of the 
tertiary system.  
Concerning  the  funding  agency,  the  “pull  factors”,  it  can  be  shown,  that  the  financial 
resources at disposal, the institutional settings and the instruments for financing research can 
trigger new requests as well as put off new applicants. The most interesting result found so far 
is,  that  the  different  scientific  disciplines  react  in  a  very  different  way  to  the  same 
circumstances and incentive structures, which points to the fact that the knowledge production 
in the different scientific fields must be governed by quite different factors and rules. Whereas 
the humanities and social sciences seem to be easily saturated when the opportunities for 
more research grants are ameliorated, the same situation “wets the appetite” for more research 
money in the field of medical sciences. At the same time a reduced probability that a research 
proposal  is  accepted  discourages  the  number  of  applicants  in  the  humanities  and  social 
sciences, whereas in the natural, exact and medical sciences it triggers more proposals in 
order to compensate for the reduced probability of acceptance. Saturation and discouragement 
for the humanities and the social sciences could be an indication that rather high sunk costs 
are attached to research proposals. This leads to a situation where refused proposals cannot 
easily  be  replaced  by  new  ones  nor  can  accepted  proposals  be  easily  supplemented  by 
additional ones. In the other scientific disciplines the different reaction to a change in the 
research funding framework shows that on the one hand that favourable conditions can be 
exploited rather easily and that because of the need for a constant flow of research money, 
deteriorating conditions have to be compensated by an increase in the requested grants. The 
fact that these disciplines can react and adapt the production of proposals in the short run also 
means that the cost of a single proposal and the possibility to replace refused proposals with 
new ones must be quite different than in the humanities and the social sciences.  
 
As regards the expansion of the tertiary system, the “push factors”, it can be noted that this 
has an impact on the number of requests for research grants but a net effect can only be 
expected in the long run. More professors – as expected – seek more research money and 
therefore push the number of proposals to the  funding agencies.  Due to the fact that the 
personnel  and  finance  resources  allocated  to  the  universities  only  react  sluggishly  to  the 
expansion in the number of students, the student/professor ratio and the finance per chair ratio 
deteriorate in the short term. Whereas the unfavourable student/professor ratio decreases the 
number of requests for grants because professors are tied up with teaching, the decrease in the 
financial resources per chair causes the opposite. Professors have to look for outside money if 
the resources at their university do not keep pace with the expansion. This provokes two 
counteracting factors, with the consequence that the expansion has no net effect in the short 
run.  
 
The findings have to a certain extent pioneering and exploring character. Therefore future 
research should – to our view – analyse further whether the high degree of uniformity of the 
instruments of research funding agencies is equally suited to all scientific disciplines. The 
same holds for the effects periods of expansion and contraction of the tertiary system can have 
on the knowledge production in individual scientific disciplines.   24 
Appendix 
 
Division grouping of disciplines 
 
  Division     Disciplines 
Division I  Philosophy, religious studies and educational 
sciences 
  Sociology, political sciences, business 
administration, economics and law 
  History 
  Archaeology, ethnology, urban studies 
  Language and literature 
Division II  Mathematics 
  Astronomy 
  Chemistry 
  Physics 
  Engineering 
  Environmental studies 
  Geography 
Division III  Basic biological science 
  General biology 
  Basic medical science 
  Experimental medicine 
  Clinical medicine 
  Preventive medicine 
  Social medicine 
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